A function f is computationally securely computable if two computationally-bounded parties Alice, having a secret input x, and Bob, having a secret input y, can talk back and forth so that (even if one of them is malicious) (1) Bob learns essentially only f (x; y) while (2) Alice learns essentially nothing.
Introduction
Secure Computation. Let f be a two-argument nite function, that is, f : S 1 S 2 ! S 3 (where S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 are nite sets), and let Alice and Bob be two possibly malicious parties, the rst having a secret input x 2 S 1 and the second having a secret input y 2 S 2 . Intuitively, securely computing f means that Alice and Bob keep turns exchanging message strings so that (1) Bob learns the value z = f(x; y), but nothing about x (which is not already implied by z and y), no matter how he cheats, while (2) Alice learns nothing about y (and thus nothing about z not already implied by x), no matter how she cheats.
In a sense, therefore, a secure computation of f has two constraints: a correctness constraint, requiring that Bob learns the correct value of f(x; y), and a privacy constraint, requiring that neither party learns more than he/she should about the other's input. Throughout this paper, any function to be securely computed is a nite, two-argument function.
The One-Sidedness of Secure Computation. The notion of secure computation informally recalled above is the traditional one used in the two-party, malicious model (cf., GMW87, Section 4.2], and Kil88, Kil90] ). This notion is \one-sided" in that only Bob learns the result of computing f, while Alice learns nothing. Such one-sidedness is unavoidable in our malicious model. In principle, one could conceive of a more general notion of secure computation in which \both Alice and Bob learn f(x; y) 1 ." However, such a more general notion is not achievable in a two-party, malicious model: the rst party who gets the desired result, if malicious, may stop executing the prescribed protocol, thus preventing the other from learning f(x; y). 2 Moreover, such a malicious party can terminate prematurely the execution of the prescribed protocol exactly when he/she \does not like" the result.
Trivial and Non-Trivial Functions. A function f is called trivial if it can be securely computed even if a cheating party has unlimited computational power, and non-trivial otherwise.
An example of a trivial function is the \projection of the rst input"; namely the function P 1 : f0; 1g f0; 1g ! f0; 1g so de ned: P 1 (b 0 ; b 1 ) = b 0 . Another example is the \exclusive-or function"; namely, the function XOR : f0; 1g f0; 1g ! f0; 1g so de ned: XOR(b 0 ; b 1 ) = b 0 + b 1 mod 2.
Indeed, a secure way of computing either function consists of having Alice send her secret bit to Bob. This elementary protocol clearly is a correct and private way of computing P Or even a more general scenario where Bob learns f (x; y) while Alice learns g(x; y).
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Or g(x; y) in the more general scenario.
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Rabin Rab81] introduced a variant of the oblivious transfer, the random oblivious transfer, and provided an implementation of it which is provably secure in the honest-but-curious model. Fischer, Micali, and Racko FMR84] improved his protocol so as to be provably secure against malicious parties. Even, Goldreich, and Lempel EGL85] introduced the notion of the chosen 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, together with an implementation of it which is provably secure in the honest-but-curious model. Finally, Cr epeau Cr e88] showed how to transform any secure protocol for the random oblivious transfer to a secure protocol for the chosen 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. Clearly, our result provides an explicit and positive answer to questions Q4 and Q5, and an explicit and negative answer to Q3. Our result also provides an implicit answer to questions Q1 and Q2. Namely, letting f be any given non-trivial function, and A f be the assumption that f is securely computable, we have:
For any non-trivial function g, assumption A f is both necessary and su cient for securely computing g.
An Interpretation of Our Main Theorem. Our main theorem also suggests that just assuming the existence of one-way functions may be insu cient to guarantee secure computation. Let us explain. Impagliazzo and Rudich IR89] show that, without also proving that P 6 = N P , no protocol having oracle-access to a random function can be proved to compute the OT function 4 The hardness of factoring implies the existence of trapdoor permutations, but the vice-versa might not hold. 5 Kilian Kil91] also proves a more general result, stating that any function with an embedded or (in particular the OR function) is complete. However, this result is given in a di erent model, where the output of the function is given to both sides.
securely. This result has been interpreted as providing strong evidence that \one-way functions are not su cient for constructing a protocol securely computing the OT function." It is then according to the same interpretation that our main theorem suggests that, for any non-trivial function f, A f should be stronger than the existence of one-way functions.
A Characterization of Trivial Functions. Is there a combinatorial property that makes a two-argument function securely computable by two, possibly malicious, parties with unbounded computing power? In our paper we also provide such a characterization (actually crucial to the proof of our main theorem 6 ) in terms of insecure minors.
We say that f contains an insecure minor if there exist inputs x 0 ; y 0 ; x 1 ; y 1 such that f(x 0 ; y 0 ) = f(x 1 ; y 0 ) and f(x 0 ; y 1 ) 6 = f(x 1 ; y 1 ), and prove the following:
Main Lemma: A two-argument function f is trivial if and only if f does not contain an insecure minor.
Comparison to the Honest-but-Curious Model
Both completeness and characterization of non-trivial functions have been extensively investigated with respect to a weaker notion of two-party secure computation introduced in GMW87]: the honest-but-curious model 7 . In this model, the parties are guaranteed to properly execute a prescribed protocol, but, at the end of it, each of them can use his/her own view of the execution to infer all he/she can about the other's input. In this model, because no protocol can be prematurely terminated, it is meaningful to consider \two-sided" secure computation of a function f; that is, one in which each party learns f(x; y), but nothing else about the other's input that is not already implicit in f(x; y) and his/her own input. Indeed this is the traditional notion of secure function computation in the honest-but-curious model.
Similar to the malicious model, a function is said to be trivial in the honest-but-curious model if it can be securely computed even if the two (honest-but-curious) parties have unbounded computing power, and non-trivial otherwise. The above mentioned results of Yao86, GMW87] immediately imply that every two-argument function is securely computable in the honest-but-curious model, under the corresponding complexity assumptions (hardness of factoring and existence of trapdoor permutations).
A combinatorial characterization of the trivial functions in the honest-but-curious model was rst given by Chor and Kushilevitz CK91] for Boolean functions (i.e., predicates), and then by Kushilevitz Kus92] for all functions.
While in the malicious model we prove that all non-trivial functions are complete, in the honestbut-curious one the \corresponding" theorem does not hold; there exists a (non-Boolean) function that is neither trivial nor complete Kus92, Kil91, KKMO98]. 8 On the other hand, Kilian, Note that our main theorem provides a characterization of both trivial and non-trivial functions, though not a combinatorial-looking one! 7
Originally called \the semi-honest model" in GMW87].
8 KKMO98] prove this by combining the following two results. Kus92] shows an example of a function which is non-trivial yet does not contain an embedded or, and Kil91] shows that a function that does not contain an embedded or cannot be complete in this model. We note that this example is a function which contains an insecure minor, and thus is complete in the malicious (one-sided) model, as we prove in this paper. vitz, Micali, and Ostrovsky KKMO98] prove that any non-trivial Boolean function is complete in the honest-but-curious model.
Preliminaries

Protocols
Following GMR86], we consider a two-party protocol as a pair, (A; B), of Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs for short). Brie y, on input (x; y), where x is a private input for A and y a private input for B, and random input (r A ; r B ), where r A is a private random tape for A and r B a private random tape for B, protocol (A; B) computes in a sequence of rounds, alternating between A-rounds and B-rounds. In an A-round (B-round) only A (only B) is active and sends a message (i.e., a string) that will become an available input to B (to A) in the next B-round (A-round). A computation of (A; B) ends in a B-round in which B sends the empty message and computes a private output. 9 Transcripts, Views, and Outputs. Letting E be an execution of protocol (A; B) on input (x; y) and random input (r A ; r B ), we de ne:
The The output of E consists of the string z output by B in the last round of E, and denoted by OUT B (y; r B ; t), where t is E's transcript. In all the above the superscript (A; B) will sometimes be omitted when clear from the context.
We shall also consider the probability distributions TRANS(x; ; y; r B ), TRANS(x; r A ; y; ) and TRANS(x; ; y; ), respectively obtained by randomly selecting r A , r B , or both, and then outputting TRANS(x; r A ; y; r B ). We also consider the similarly de ned random variables VIEW A (x; ; y; r B ), VIEW A (x; r A ; y; ), VIEW A (x; ; y; ), VIEW B (x; ; y; r B ), VIEW B (x; r A ; y; ), VIEW B (x; ; y; ), OUT B (x; ; y; r B ), OUT B (x; r A ; y; ), and OUT B (x; ; y; ).
Secure Computation in the Unbounded Honest-but-Curious Model
Among all notions of secure computation, the one for two unbounded honest-but-curious parties is the simplest one to formalize. In this model the parties Alice and Bob are guaranteed to follow the prescribed protocol (A; B) (namely they use the right ITMs A and B), but may try to obtain as much information as they can from their own views. Intuitively, for a protocol to be secure in this model, the following conditions must hold: (1) Bob learns the value z = f(x; y), but nothing 9 Due to the one-sidedness of secure computation, only machine B produces an output. about x (not already implied by z and y), while (2) Alice learns nothing about y ( Equivalently, the corresponding transcripts are identically distributed (and similarly below).
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By this we do not mean that the parties participating in a protocol computing a trivial function are computationally-unbounded, but that the \privacy and correctness" of their computation holds even when one of them is allowed to be malicious and computationally-unbounded. 
The Combinatorial Characterization
We prove that the trivial functions are exactly those that do not contain an insecure minor (a simple generalization of an embedded or CK91] By the previous condition, the mapping IA (i.e., for honest Alice) gives a \correct" input, which is either x itself or \equivalent" to x, in the sense that it yields the same output f (x; y).
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An embedded or is an insecure minor in which a = b. As shown in CK91], having an embedded or implies non-triviality in the two-sided honest-but-curious model, and characterizes the Boolean non-trivial functions in this model. 14 This graphical convention will be used in the rest of the paper, namely a table where columns correspond to possible inputs for Alice, rows correspond to possible inputs for Bob, and the entries are the corresponding output values. Proof We break the proof into two parts.
Theorem 1 follows from the following Claim 1 and Claim 2. First, we assume that f does not contain an insecure minor and prove that f is trivial by constructing a protocol (A; B) that securely computes f against malicious unbounded parties. Fix any x 0 2 S 1 and y 0 2 S 2 . The protocol (A; B), described in Figure 1 , has a single round of communication (one message sent from A to B), and is deterministic (namely A and B ignore their random inputs). We rst prove the correctness of the protocol. Recall that x and y are the inputs held by honest Alice and honest Bob respectively. Alice's correctness follows since for any message a = f(x; y 0 ) sent by honest Alice, an honest Bob nds x 1 such that f(x; y 0 ) = f(x 1 ; y 0 ). Since f does not contain an insecure minor then it must hold that f(x; y) = f(x 1 ; y) (otherwise x; x 1 ; y 0 ; y constitute an insecure minor). Thus, Bob's output, namely f(x 1 ; y), is correct.
To prove Bob's correctness, we rst de ne the following input function I A 0 : f0; 1g ! S 3 where if there is no x 1 such that a = f(x 1 ; y 0 ) then I A 0 (x; r A ; a) = x 0 and otherwise I A 0 (x; r A ; a) is the lexicographically rst x 1 such that a = f( Alice's privacy follows by observing that all information sent to Bob, namely f(x; y 0 ), can be computed by Bob alone from the output of the function f(x; y). This is because Bob can nd some (1) We next argue that this transcript is equally distributed even if we x the random input of Bob. We use the following standard proposition that holds for every protocol (see, e.g., ]). On the other hand, by Equation (1) 
Since Pr rA;rB TRANS(x 0 ; ; y 1 ; ) = t ] = Pr rA;rB TRANS(x 1 ; ; y 1 ; ) = t ] and by (2) 
The Round Complexity of Secure Computation against Unbounded Malicious Parties
Typically, multiple rounds and probabilism are crucial ingredients of secure computation. As stated in the following corollary, however, two-party secure computation in the unbounded malicious model is an exception.
Corollary 1 If a function f is securely computable in the unbounded malicious model, then it is so computable by a deterministic single-round (actually, single-message) protocol.
Proof The corollary follows immediately from our proof of Theorem 1 (rather than from its statement). That proof, in fact, shows that, if a function f is computable in the unbounded twoparty malicious model, then it is so computed by the protocol of Figure 1 , in which only a single message is exchanged (from A to B).
Together with the above corollary, our proof of Theorem 1 (actually, of Claim 2 alone) also immediately implies the following relationship between secure computation in the unbounded honestbut-curious model and in the unbounded malicious one.
Corollary 2 If a two-argument function f is not securely computable deterministically and in one round in the unbounded malicious model, then it is not securely computable in the unbounded honest-but-curious model, even by probabilistic and multi-round protocols.
Characterization of Complete Functions
In this section we prove that every function that contains an insecure minor is complete for secure computation. That is, every non-trivial function is complete.
We consider secure computation in the (computationally) bounded malicious model. That is, the computation is secure provided that the (malicious) parties run in polynomial time. Thus, for the privacy conditions to hold, the appropriate probability distributions are only required to be indistinguishable by polynomial time Turing Machines (rather than identical as in the unbounded case). In our proof we also consider the bounded honest-but-curious model. For lack of space we do not give precise de nitions of secure computation in the bounded models, de nitions which are much more involved and complex than the de nitions in the unbounded models. Such de nitions can be found, e.g., in Gol98]. We note that our results hold for all reasonable de nitions of secure computation in these model.
Reductions and Completeness
As usual, the de nition of completeness relies on that of a reduction.
De nition 5 (Reductions) Let f( ; ) and g( ; ) be nite functions. We say that the function g Informally, a function g reduces to a function f if a secure protocol for f can be converted to a secure protocol for g without any additional assumptions. (Even more informally, f is \harder" to compute securely than g.) Note that our de nitions of completeness and reductions are broader than the black-box based de nition previously proposed in, e.g., CK88, Kil91, KKMO98]. Our notions are natural, and very suitable for dealing with the assumptions that are su cient for secure computations, i.e., for addressing the questions discussed in the introduction. This is demonstrated by our main theorem as well as the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Let f and g be nite functions such that g reduces to f in the bounded malicious model of secure computation. Then any assumption su cient for computing f securely in the bounded malicious model is also su cient for securely computing g in the same model. Proof Consider a protocol (A f ; B f ) that securely computes f under some assumption ASSUM f .
Since g reduces to f, we can apply the transformation from (A f ; B f ) to obtain a protocol (A g ; B g ) such that if (A f ; B f ) securely computes f then (A g ; B g ) securely computes g. Thus, if ASSUM f holds then (A g ; B g ) securely computes g. 
Main Theorem
Theorem 2 If f( ; ) is a non-trivial function, then f is complete in the bounded malicious model. Proof Outline Although we aim towards the bounded malicious model, our proof of Theorem 2 wanders through the bounded honest-but-curious model (more direct proofs seem problematic 16 ). We rst prove that every non-trivial function is complete in the honest-but-curious model. We then use standard techniques of GMW87] to transform any secure protocol in the bounded honest-butcurious model into a secure protocol in the bounded malicious model. In general this transformation requires some complexity assumptions, however in our case the protocol in the honest-but-curious model implies these assumptions. Thus, combining the above steps, every non-trivial function is complete in the malicious model.
Proof We start by proving the analogue of Theorem 2 for the honest-but-curious model. For example, we cannot use Kilian's reduction Kil91] from OT to a two-sided computation of OR in the bounded malicious model. If we modify the reduction so that only one party receives the output of the OR and sends it to the other party, then the reduction is no longer secure, since if this party (whether we let it be Alice or Bob) is malicious then it can obtain an advantage by sending wrong output values to the other.
Proof It is proven in GV87] that OT is complete in the bounded honest-but-curious model. Therefore, to establish our claim it su ces to prove that whenever f contains an insecure minor then OT reduces to f.
Let (A f ; B f ) be a secure protocol computing the function f in the bounded honest-but-curious model. Because the function f contains an insecure minor, there are values x 0 ; x 1 ; y 0 ; y 1 ; a; b and c such that b 6 = c, f(x 0 ; y 0 ) = f(x 1 ; y 0 ) = a, f(x 0 ; y 1 ) = b, and f(x 1 ; y 1 ) = c.
In Figure 2 we describe a protocol (A OT ; B OT ) which securely computes OT using this insecure minor and the protocol (A f ; B f ). In Protocol (A OT ; B OT ) it holds that z { = f(x { ; y 1 ), and, thus, z { = b if { = 0 and the output of B OT is correct. We next argue that the privacy constrains are satis ed for bounded honestbut-curious parties A OT and B OT . First note that the only messages exchanged in (A OT ; B OT ) are during the executions of (A f ; B f ). Since (A f ; B f ) computes f securely, A f (and thus A OT ) does not learn any information about {. Recall that B f is not allowed to learn any information that is not implied by his input and the output of the function. In the case of OT, this means B OT should not learn any information about { . However, the only information that A OT sends that depends on { are during the execution of (A f ; B f ) on input (x { ; y 0 ) and, thus, z { = a for both values of { . By the fact that (A f ; B f ) computes f securely, B f does not learn any information on { .
Protocol (A OT
Note that the above protocol is secure only if B OT is honest. Also note that in protocol (A OT ; B OT ) it is important that only B f gets the outputs z 0 and z 1 of (A f ; B f ). That is, if A OT gets z 0 or z 1 then she can learn B OT 's input for at least one of the possible values of her input (since either b 6 = a or c 6 = a or both).
Let us now prove an \hybrid result" bridging the completeness in the two bounded models of secure computation.
Claim 4 Let f( ; ) be any nite function. If f is complete in the bounded honest-but-curious model then it is complete in the bounded malicious model. Proof Let g be any nite function. We need to prove that g reduces to f in the bounded malicious model. We are promised that g reduces to f in the bounded honest-but-curious model. That is, there is a transformation from any protocol securely computing f to one securely computing g in the bounded honest-but-curious model.
To obtain a protocol securely computing g in the malicious model, we proceed as follows. First, there exists a transformation mapping any protocol that securely computes OT in the bounded honest-but-curious model into a one-way function IL89]. Second, since f is complete in the bounded honest-but-curious model, this implies that there exists a transformation mapping any protocol that securely computes f in the bounded honest-but-curious model into a one-way function. Third, one-way functions imply pseudo-random generators HILL91], which in turn imply bit commitment Nao91]. Finally, bit commitment implies that it is possible to transform any protocol securely computing an arbitrary function g in the bounded honest-but-curious model into a protocol securely computing g in the bounded malicious model GMW87]. Putting the above together, we obtain a transformation from a protocol securely computing f in the bounded honest-but-curious model to one computing the function g in the bounded malicious model.
We are ready to complete the proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1 any non-trivial function f contains an insecure minor. Thus, by Claim 3 and Claim 4, f is complete in the bounded malicious model.
